diff --git a/powershell/ql/src/queries/security/cwe-494/DownloadWithoutIntegrityCheck.qhelp b/powershell/ql/src/queries/security/cwe-494/DownloadWithoutIntegrityCheck.qhelp index 9af562220470..433696cc589e 100644 --- a/powershell/ql/src/queries/security/cwe-494/DownloadWithoutIntegrityCheck.qhelp +++ b/powershell/ql/src/queries/security/cwe-494/DownloadWithoutIntegrityCheck.qhelp @@ -6,15 +6,29 @@

- Downloading an artifact (such as an executable, installer, archive, or script) and then - using it without verifying its integrity allows an attacker who can tamper with the artifact - to execute arbitrary code on the machine. Even when the artifact is retrieved from a trusted - source such as GitHub over HTTPS, the contents can still be replaced through a compromised - account, a malicious release asset, a poisoned cache or mirror, or a man-in-the-middle attack. + An attacker who can influence a downloaded executable, installer, module, assembly, or script + can execute code when that artifact is run or loaded without effective verification. + This query requires both an insecure or explicitly modeled remotely controlled origin and + a downstream code-execution or code-loading operation.

- Without an integrity check, there is no guarantee that the bytes that were downloaded are the - bytes that were intended, so the downloaded artifact must not be trusted. + Plain HTTP downloads are analyzed under an on-path-attacker threat model. Remote-input + models can also identify downloads whose entire URL comes from an inbound request. + Ordinary function parameters, environment variables, and generic HTTPS download responses + are not automatically considered attacker controlled. +

+

+ Fixed HTTPS origins, download-only and extraction-only operations, and ordinary configuration + retrieval are outside this query's strict scope. These exclusions are not proof that the + corresponding operations are safe. Hostname substrings and build, test, or dependency paths + are not used to establish severity or trust. +

+

+ The query tracks modeled file copies, moves, renames, file reads and writes, and archive members + constructed below an extraction directory. File lifecycle and verification paths are evaluated + within a control-flow scope; custom filesystem wrappers and runtime-computed paths may not be + resolved. Findings identify high-impact candidates, not a guarantee of high severity in every + deployment.

@@ -27,12 +41,27 @@ value; otherwise, discard it and fail. Where available, prefer verifying a digital signature of the artifact in addition to, or instead of, a plain hash comparison.

+

+ Computing or logging a hash is not an integrity check by itself. Compare the complete digest + against a trusted expected value, and ensure that a mismatch stops execution before the artifact + is installed, loaded, extracted, or run. An optional check, a swallowed exception, or a check + performed only after the artifact has been used does not provide this protection. +

+

+ Signature verification must also establish the intended publisher. For Authenticode, check + that the signature is valid and that the signer certificate matches a trusted pinned + certificate thumbprint. Modeled native checks include GPG with a fixed + --assert-signer fingerprint and Cosign blob verification with fixed certificate + identity and OIDC issuer. The native verifier's successful exit code must be enforced before + use; merely invoking a signature tool or inspecting its output does not verify the artifact. + A constant path to a public-key file alone does not establish that the key is trusted. +

- In the following example, an executable is downloaded from GitHub and then run directly. Because - the artifact is never verified, a tampered download is executed without detection. + In the following example, an executable is downloaded over HTTP and then run directly. + An on-path attacker can replace the executable, which is never verified.

@@ -57,6 +86,14 @@ Microsoft Learn: Get-FileHash. +
  • + GnuPG: + GPG configuration options. +
  • +
  • + Sigstore: + Verifying signatures. +
  • diff --git a/powershell/ql/src/queries/security/cwe-494/DownloadWithoutIntegrityCheck.ql b/powershell/ql/src/queries/security/cwe-494/DownloadWithoutIntegrityCheck.ql index f9c1d98aeab4..ba0c9ab38534 100644 --- a/powershell/ql/src/queries/security/cwe-494/DownloadWithoutIntegrityCheck.ql +++ b/powershell/ql/src/queries/security/cwe-494/DownloadWithoutIntegrityCheck.ql @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /** - * @name Unvalidated Artifact Download - * @description Download of artifact without integrity check. + * @name Execution of an attacker-influenced download without verification + * @description Code from an insecure or attacker-controlled download is executed without an effective integrity or publisher check. * @kind problem * @problem.severity warning * @security-severity 7.5 @@ -14,132 +14,1063 @@ import powershell import semmle.code.powershell.dataflow.DataFlow import semmle.code.powershell.dataflow.TaintTracking +import semmle.code.powershell.controlflow.ControlFlowGraph +import semmle.code.powershell.controlflow.CfgNodes +import semmle.code.powershell.dataflow.flowsources.Remote -/** Holds if `s` looks like a URL pointing at a trusted artifact host. */ -bindingset[s] -predicate isTrustedArtifactHost(string s) { - s.matches([ - "%github%", - "%gitlab%", - "%bitbucket%", - "%sourceforge%", - "%powershellgallery%", - "%nuget%", - "%npmjs%", - "%pypi%", - "%repo1.maven%", - "%repo.maven.apache%", - "%blob.core.windows%", - "%amazonaws%", - "%googleapis%", - "%azure%", - "%visualstudio%", - "%jfrog%", - "%artifactory%" - ]) -} - -/** A data-flow node that is tainted by a string constant looking like an artifact URL. */ -class ArtifactUrl extends DataFlow::Node { - ArtifactUrl() { - exists(DataFlow::Node source, string s | - TaintTracking::localTaint(source, this) and - s = - [ - source.asExpr().getValue().asString(), - source.asExpr().getExpr().(ExpandableStringExpr).getUnexpandedValue() - ].toLowerCase() and - isTrustedArtifactHost(s) and - // Exclude API metadata endpoints (e.g. api.github.com/.../releases/latest), - // which return JSON metadata rather than a downloadable artifact. - not s.matches(["%api.github.com%", "%api.bitbucket.org%"]) - ) - } +/** Gets a cmdlet's named argument, or its positional argument when not named. */ +bindingset[name, position] +DataFlow::Node getArgument(DataFlow::CallNode call, string name, int position) { + result = call.getNamedArgument(name) + or + not call.hasNamedArgument(name) and + result = call.getPositionalArgument(position) } -/** - * A call that downloads an artifact from a trusted host. - * - * This covers cmdlets and their aliases (`Invoke-WebRequest`/`iwr`, - * `Invoke-RestMethod`/`irm`, `Start-BitsTransfer`), native download tools - * (`curl`, `wget`, `azcopy`, `aria2c`) and the .NET `WebClient`/`HttpClient` - * download methods. The URL may be passed as a named argument (e.g. `-Uri`, - * `-Source`), positionally, or as a method argument. - */ -class DownloadCall extends DataFlow::CallNode { - ArtifactUrl url; +/** Gets a pipeline argument without confusing it with the command's ordinary arguments. */ +DataFlow::Node getPipelineInput(DataFlow::CallNode call) { + result.asExpr() = call.getCallNode().getPipelineArgument() +} +/** Holds if `node` has an explicitly known .NET receiver type. */ +bindingset[type] +predicate hasType(DataFlow::Node node, string type) { + exists(DataFlow::ObjectCreationNode creation | + ( + creation.getLowerCaseConstructedTypeName() = type.toLowerCase() + or + creation.getQualifier().asExpr().getExpr().(TypeNameExpr).getPossiblyQualifiedName() = + type.toLowerCase() + ) and + DataFlow::localFlow(creation, node) + ) + or + exists(DataFlow::Node parameter | + parameter.asParameter().getAnAttribute().(TypeConstraint).getName().toLowerCase() = + type.toLowerCase() and + DataFlow::localFlow(parameter, node) + ) +} + +predicate isDotNetDownload(DataFlow::CallNode call) { + call.getAName() = + [ + "DownloadFile", "DownloadFileAsync", "DownloadFileTaskAsync", "DownloadData", + "DownloadDataAsync", "DownloadDataTaskAsync", "DownloadString", "DownloadStringAsync", + "DownloadStringTaskAsync", "GetStringAsync", "GetByteArrayAsync", "GetStreamAsync" + ] +} + +/** A download, with URL and destination roles modeled separately. */ +class DownloadCall extends DataFlow::CallNode { DownloadCall() { this.getAName() = [ - // cmdlets and aliases - "Invoke-WebRequest", "iwr", "Invoke-RestMethod", "irm", "Start-BitsTransfer", - // native command-line download tools - "curl", "curl.exe", "wget", "wget.exe", "azcopy", "azcopy.exe", "aria2c", "aria2c.exe", - // .NET WebClient / HttpClient download methods - "DownloadFile", "DownloadFileAsync", "DownloadFileTaskAsync", "DownloadData", - "DownloadDataAsync", "DownloadDataTaskAsync", "DownloadString", "DownloadStringAsync", - "GetByteArrayAsync", "GetStreamAsync" - ] and - url = this.getAnArgument() - } - - /** - * Gets the argument that names the file the artifact is written to, if any. - * Downloads that consume the response inline (e.g. `irm ... | iex`) have no - * such argument. - */ + "Invoke-WebRequest", "iwr", "Invoke-RestMethod", "irm", "curl", "wget", + "Start-BitsTransfer", "curl.exe", "wget.exe", "azcopy", "azcopy.exe", "aria2c", "aria2c.exe" + ] + or + isDotNetDownload(this) and + hasType(this.getQualifier(), + ["System.Net.WebClient", "Net.WebClient", "System.Net.Http.HttpClient", "Net.Http.HttpClient"]) + } + + DataFlow::Node getUrl() { + this.getAName() = ["Invoke-WebRequest", "iwr", "Invoke-RestMethod", "irm", "curl", "wget"] and + result = getArgument(this, "uri", 0) + or + this.getAName() = "Start-BitsTransfer" and + result = getArgument(this, "source", 0) + or + this.getAName() = ["curl.exe", "wget.exe", "aria2c", "aria2c.exe"] and + result = [this.getNamedArgument("url"), this.getPositionalArgument(0)] + or + this.getAName() = ["azcopy", "azcopy.exe"] and + this.getPositionalArgument(0).asExpr().getValue().asString().toLowerCase() = "copy" and + result = this.getPositionalArgument(1) + or + this.asExpr().getExpr() instanceof InvokeMemberExpr and + result = this.getArgument(0) + } + DataFlow::Node getOutFileArg() { - result = - this.getNamedArgument([ - "outfile", "destination", "outputfile", "outpath", "literalpath", "path", "o" - ]) + this.getAName() = ["Invoke-WebRequest", "iwr", "Invoke-RestMethod", "irm", "curl", "wget"] and + result = this.getNamedArgument("outfile") + or + this.getAName() = "Start-BitsTransfer" and + result = getArgument(this, "destination", 1) + or + this.getAName() = ["curl.exe", "wget.exe", "aria2c", "aria2c.exe"] and + result = this.getNamedArgument(["o", "output"]) + or + this.getAName() = ["azcopy", "azcopy.exe"] and + result = this.getPositionalArgument(2) or - // WebClient.DownloadFile(url, destinationFile): the destination is the 2nd argument. this.getAName() = ["DownloadFile", "DownloadFileAsync", "DownloadFileTaskAsync"] and result = this.getArgument(1) } + + /** Gets returned content; an ordinary file download's status output is not its body. */ + DataFlow::Node getContent() { + not exists(this.getOutFileArg()) and + not this.getAName() = + ["Start-BitsTransfer", "wget.exe", "azcopy", "azcopy.exe", "aria2c", "aria2c.exe"] and + result = this + } } -/** - * A call that verifies the integrity of a file, by computing/comparing a hash - * or by checking a signature. - */ -class IntegrityCheck extends DataFlow::CallNode { - IntegrityCheck() { +/** Holds if an entire expression is known to start with the insecure HTTP scheme. */ +predicate hasHttpPrefix(Expr expr) { + [ + expr.getValue().asString(), + expr.(ExpandableStringExpr).getUnexpandedValue() + ].toLowerCase().matches("http://%") + or + expr instanceof AddExpr and + hasHttpPrefix(expr.(AddExpr).getLeft()) +} + +/** Explicit inbound request data, not an arbitrary parameter or environment variable. */ +class RequestUrlInput extends DataFlow::Node { + RequestUrlInput() { + exists(IndexExpr index, MemberExpr query, DataFlow::Node receiver, DataFlow::Node collection | + query.memberNameMatches("QueryString") and + receiver.asExpr().getExpr() = query.getQualifier() and + hasType(receiver, ["System.Net.HttpListenerRequest", "Net.HttpListenerRequest"]) and + collection.asExpr().getExpr() = query and + DataFlow::localFlow(collection, any(DataFlow::Node n | n.asExpr().getExpr() = index.getBase())) and + this.asExpr().getExpr() = index + ) + } +} + +module HttpOriginConf implements DataFlow::ConfigSig { + predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { hasHttpPrefix(source.asExpr().getExpr()) } + + predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink = any(DownloadCall d).getUrl() } +} + +module HttpOriginFlow = DataFlow::Global; + +module RemoteOriginConf implements DataFlow::ConfigSig { + predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { + source instanceof RequestUrlInput + or + source instanceof RemoteFlowSource and + // Generic download responses do not establish control by a less-trusted caller. + not source instanceof DownloadCall and + not isDotNetDownload(source.(DataFlow::CallNode)) + } + + predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink = any(DownloadCall d).getUrl() } +} + +module RemoteOriginFlow = DataFlow::Global; + +/** A call that computes a hash, rather than verifying a signature. */ +class HashCheck extends DataFlow::CallNode { + HashCheck() { + this.getAName() = ["Get-FileHash", "gfh", "certutil", "certutil.exe", "ComputeHash"] + } + + /** Gets the path of the file whose contents are hashed. */ + DataFlow::Node getHashedFile() { + this.getAName() = ["Get-FileHash", "gfh"] and + result = [this.getNamedArgument(["path", "literalpath"]), this.getPositionalArgument(0)] + or + this.getAName() = ["certutil", "certutil.exe"] and + result = this.getNamedArgument("hashfile") + or + this.getAName() = "ComputeHash" and + not exists(this.getArgument(1)) and + exists(DataFlow::CallNode read | + read.getAName() = ["ReadAllBytes", "OpenRead"] and + DataFlow::localFlow(read, this.getArgument(0)) and + result = read.getArgument(0) + ) + } + + /** Gets the computed digest, excluding unrelated properties of a hash object. */ + DataFlow::Node getDigest() { + this.getAName() = ["Get-FileHash", "gfh"] and + exists(MemberExpr member, DataFlow::Node qualifier | + member.memberNameMatches("Hash") and + qualifier.asExpr().getExpr() = member.getQualifier() and + DataFlow::localFlow(this, qualifier) and + result.asExpr().getExpr() = member + ) + or + this.getAName() = ["certutil", "certutil.exe", "ComputeHash"] and + result = this + } +} + +/** Holds if a static method is invoked on the given .NET type. */ +bindingset[type] +predicate isStaticCall(DataFlow::CallNode call, string type) { + call.getQualifier().asExpr().getExpr().(TypeNameExpr).getPossiblyQualifiedName() = + type.toLowerCase() +} + +/** Gets a cmdlet's source file, without accepting unrelated arguments as files. */ +DataFlow::Node getFileArgument(DataFlow::CallNode call) { + result = call.getNamedArgument("literalpath") + or + not call.hasNamedArgument("literalpath") and + result = getArgument(call, "path", 0) +} + +/** A read of file contents, not a use of the path string as file contents. */ +class FileRead extends DataFlow::CallNode { + FileRead() { + this.getAName() = ["Get-Content", "gc", "cat", "type"] + or + this.getAName() = ["ReadAllBytes", "ReadAllText", "OpenRead"] and + isStaticCall(this, ["System.IO.File", "IO.File"]) + } + + DataFlow::Node getFile() { + this.asExpr().getExpr() instanceof InvokeMemberExpr and result = this.getArgument(0) + or + not this.asExpr().getExpr() instanceof InvokeMemberExpr and result = getFileArgument(this) + or + // Unknown switch binding currently attaches a following positional path to -Raw. + this.getAName() = ["Get-Content", "gc", "cat", "type"] and + not exists(getFileArgument(this)) and + result = this.getNamedArgument("raw") + } +} + +/** A file-preserving copy, move, or rename. */ +class FileTransfer extends DataFlow::CallNode { + FileTransfer() { this.getAName() = [ - "Get-FileHash", "gfh", // hash a file - "certutil", "certutil.exe", // certutil -hashfile SHA256 - "ComputeHash", // [SHA256]::Create().ComputeHash(...) - "Get-AuthenticodeSignature", "Test-FileCatalog", // signature / catalog checks - "cosign", "cosign.exe", "gpg", "gpg.exe" // external signature verification + "Copy-Item", "cp", "copy", "cpi", "Move-Item", "mv", "move", "mi", "Rename-Item", "ren", + "rni" ] } - /** Gets an argument referring to the file whose integrity is being checked. */ - DataFlow::Node getFile() { result = this.getAnArgument() } + DataFlow::Node getInput() { result = getFileArgument(this) } + + DataFlow::Node getOutput() { + not this.getAName() = ["Rename-Item", "ren", "rni"] and + result = getArgument(this, "destination", 1) + or + this.hasNamedArgument("passthru") and + exists(MemberExpr member, DataFlow::Node receiver | + member.memberNameMatches("FullName") and + receiver.asExpr().getExpr() = member.getQualifier() and + DataFlow::localFlow(this, receiver) and + result.asExpr().getExpr() = member + ) + } + + predicate removesInput() { + this.getAName() = ["Move-Item", "mv", "move", "mi", "Rename-Item", "ren", "rni"] + } +} + +/** An overwrite of a file with content from an expression or pipeline. */ +class FileWrite extends DataFlow::CallNode { + FileWrite() { + this.getAName() = ["Set-Content", "sc"] + or + this.getAName() = "Out-File" and not this.hasNamedArgument("append") + or + this.getAName() = ["WriteAllBytes", "WriteAllText"] and + isStaticCall(this, ["System.IO.File", "IO.File"]) + } + + DataFlow::Node getFile() { + this.getAName() = ["Set-Content", "sc"] and result = getFileArgument(this) + or + this.getAName() = "Out-File" and result = getArgument(this, "filepath", 0) + or + this.asExpr().getExpr() instanceof InvokeMemberExpr and result = this.getArgument(0) + } + + DataFlow::Node getContent() { + this.getAName() = ["Set-Content", "sc"] and + result = [getArgument(this, "value", 1), getPipelineInput(this)] + or + this.getAName() = "Out-File" and + result = [this.getNamedArgument("inputobject"), getPipelineInput(this)] + or + this.asExpr().getExpr() instanceof InvokeMemberExpr and result = this.getArgument(1) + } +} + +/** An extraction operation. Extraction alone is deliberately not an execution sink. */ +class ArchiveExtraction extends DataFlow::CallNode { + ArchiveExtraction() { + this.getAName() = "Expand-Archive" + or + this.getAName() = "ExtractToDirectory" and + isStaticCall(this, ["System.IO.Compression.ZipFile", "IO.Compression.ZipFile"]) + } + + DataFlow::Node getFile() { + this.getAName() = "Expand-Archive" and result = getFileArgument(this) + or + this.getAName() = "ExtractToDirectory" and result = this.getArgument(0) + } + + DataFlow::Node getDirectory() { + this.getAName() = "Expand-Archive" and result = getArgument(this, "destinationpath", 1) + or + this.getAName() = "ExtractToDirectory" and result = this.getArgument(1) + } +} + +/** A path constructed under a directory using a fixed, non-traversing relative name. */ +class ChildPath extends DataFlow::CallNode { + ChildPath() { + this.getAName() = "Join-Path" + or + this.getAName() = "Combine" and isStaticCall(this, ["System.IO.Path", "IO.Path"]) + } + + DataFlow::Node getDirectory() { + this.getAName() = "Join-Path" and result = getArgument(this, "path", 0) + or + this.getAName() = "Combine" and result = this.getArgument(0) + } + + DataFlow::Node getChild() { + this.getAName() = "Join-Path" and + not this.hasNamedArgument("additionalchildpath") and + not exists(this.getPositionalArgument(2)) and + result = getArgument(this, "childpath", 1) + or + this.getAName() = "Combine" and + not exists(this.getArgument(2)) and + result = this.getArgument(1) + } + + predicate isRelative() { + exists(string child | + child = this.getChild().asExpr().getValue().asString() and + child != "" and + not child.matches(["/%", "\\%", "%:%", "%..%"]) + ) + } +} + +/** A use that executes downloaded code, rather than merely retrieving or unpacking it. */ +predicate isExecutablePath(DataFlow::Node node) { + exists(DataFlow::Node literal, string path | + DataFlow::localFlow(literal, node) and + path = + [ + literal.asExpr().getValue().asString(), + literal.asExpr().getExpr().(ExpandableStringExpr).getUnexpandedValue() + ].toLowerCase() and + path.matches(["%.exe", "%.com", "%.cmd", "%.bat", "%.msi"]) + ) + or + exists(ChildPath path | DataFlow::localFlow(path, node) and isExecutablePath(path.getChild())) +} + +class CodeExecution extends DataFlow::CallNode { + CodeExecution() { + this instanceof DataFlow::CallOperatorNode or + this instanceof DataFlow::DotSourcingOperatorNode or + this.getAName() = + [ + "Import-Module", "ipmo", "Start-Process", "saps", "start", "Add-Type", "LoadFrom", + "LoadFile", "powershell", "powershell.exe", "pwsh", "pwsh.exe", "msiexec", "msiexec.exe", + "Invoke-Expression", "iex", "Load" + ] + } + + DataFlow::Node getFile() { + this instanceof DataFlow::CallOperatorNode and + result = this.(DataFlow::CallOperatorNode).getCommand() + or + this instanceof DataFlow::DotSourcingOperatorNode and + result = this.(DataFlow::DotSourcingOperatorNode).getCommand() + or + this.getAName() = ["Import-Module", "ipmo"] and result = getArgument(this, "name", 0) + or + this.getAName() = ["Start-Process", "saps", "start"] and + result = getArgument(this, "filepath", 0) and + isExecutablePath(result) + or + this.getAName() = "Add-Type" and result = this.getNamedArgument(["path", "literalpath"]) + or + this.getAName() = ["LoadFrom", "LoadFile"] and + isStaticCall(this, ["System.Reflection.Assembly", "Reflection.Assembly"]) and + result = this.getArgument(0) + or + this.getAName() = ["powershell", "powershell.exe", "pwsh", "pwsh.exe"] and + result = this.getNamedArgument("file") + or + this.getAName() = ["msiexec", "msiexec.exe"] and + exists(int i | + this.getPositionalArgument(i).asExpr().getValue().asString().toLowerCase() = + ["/i", "/package"] and + result = this.getPositionalArgument(i + 1) + ) + or + this.getAName() = ["Start-Process", "saps", "start"] and + exists(DataFlow::Node arguments, ArrayLiteral array, string host, string option, int i | + hasFixedValue(getArgument(this, "filepath", 0), host) and + DataFlow::localFlow(arguments, getArgument(this, "argumentlist", 1)) and + arguments.asExpr().getExpr() = array and + option = array.getExpr(i).getValue().asString().toLowerCase() and + ( + host.toLowerCase() = ["msiexec", "msiexec.exe"] and option = ["/i", "/package"] + or + host.toLowerCase() = ["powershell", "powershell.exe", "pwsh", "pwsh.exe"] and + option = "-file" + ) and + result.asExpr().getExpr() = array.getExpr(i + 1) + ) + } + + DataFlow::Node getContent() { + this.getAName() = ["Invoke-Expression", "iex"] and + result = [getArgument(this, "command", 0), getPipelineInput(this)] + or + this.getAName() = "Load" and + isStaticCall(this, ["System.Reflection.Assembly", "Reflection.Assembly"]) and + result = this.getArgument(0) + or + this instanceof DataFlow::CallOperatorNode and + result = this.(DataFlow::CallOperatorNode).getCommand() and + exists(DataFlow::CallNode create | + create.getAName() = "Create" and + isStaticCall(create, ["System.Management.Automation.ScriptBlock", "ScriptBlock"]) and + DataFlow::localFlow(create, result) + ) + } +} + +module FileConf implements DataFlow::ConfigSig { + predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { + source = any(DownloadCall d).getOutFileArg() or + source = any(FileTransfer t).getOutput() or + source = any(FileWrite w).getFile() or + source = any(ArchiveExtraction e).getDirectory() or + source instanceof ChildPath + } + + predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { + sink = any(DataFlow::CallNode c).getAnArgument() or + sink = any(CodeExecution c).getFile() or + sink = any(FileTransfer t).getOutput() or + sink = any(ChildPath p).getDirectory() + } +} + +// File names retain their value; arbitrary string taint is not file identity. +module FileFlow = DataFlow::Global; + +predicate sameFile(DataFlow::Node file, DataFlow::Node other) { + DataFlow::localFlow(file, other) + or + FileFlow::flow(file, other) + or + exists(string path | + path = file.asExpr().getValue().asString() and + path != "" and + path = other.asExpr().getValue().asString() and + file.asExpr().getScope() = other.asExpr().getScope() + ) + or + exists(ChildPath first, ChildPath second, string child | + first.isRelative() and + second.isRelative() and + DataFlow::localFlow(first, file) and + DataFlow::localFlow(second, other) and + hasFixedValue(first.getChild(), child) and + hasFixedValue(second.getChild(), child) and + ( + sameFile(first.getDirectory(), second.getDirectory()) + or + sameFile(second.getDirectory(), first.getDirectory()) + ) + ) +} + +predicate archiveMember(DataFlow::Node directory, DataFlow::Node member) { + exists(ChildPath path | + path.isRelative() and + member = path and + (sameFile(directory, path.getDirectory()) or archiveMember(directory, path.getDirectory())) + ) +} + +/** Holds if `first` dominates and is evaluated before `second`. */ +predicate precedes(CfgNode first, CfgNode second) { + first.getBasicBlock().strictlyDominates(second.getBasicBlock()) + or + exists(int i, int j | + first = first.getBasicBlock().getNode(i) and + second = first.getBasicBlock().getNode(j) and + i < j + ) +} + +/** Holds if `expected` is a fixed, complete hexadecimal digest. */ +predicate isExpectedDigest(DataFlow::Node expected) { + exists(DataFlow::LocalSourceNode constant | DataFlow::localFlow(constant, expected)) and + forall(DataFlow::LocalSourceNode constant | DataFlow::localFlow(constant, expected) | + exists(string digest | + digest = constant.asExpr().getValue().asString() and + digest.regexpMatch("[0-9a-fA-F]+") and + digest.length() = [32, 40, 64, 96, 128] + ) + ) +} + +/** A value-preserving step or a lossless conversion of a digest to hexadecimal text. */ +predicate digestStep(DataFlow::Node input, DataFlow::Node output) { + DataFlow::localFlowStep(input, output) + or + exists(DataFlow::CallNode format, TypeNameExpr type | + format.getQualifier().asExpr().getExpr() = type and + ( + type.getPossiblyQualifiedName() = ["System.BitConverter", "BitConverter"].toLowerCase() and + format.getAName() = "ToString" + or + type.getPossiblyQualifiedName() = ["System.Convert", "Convert"].toLowerCase() and + format.getAName() = "ToHexString" + ) and + input = format.getArgument(0) and + not exists(format.getArgument(1)) and + output = format + ) + or + exists(DataFlow::CallNode format | + input = format.getQualifier() and + output = format and + ( + format.getAName() = "Replace" and + format.getArgument(0).asExpr().getValue().asString() = "-" and + format.getArgument(1).asExpr().getValue().asString() = "" + or + format.getAName() = ["ToLower", "ToUpper", "ToLowerInvariant", "ToUpperInvariant"] and + not exists(format.getAnArgument()) + ) + ) +} + +/** A control-flow step that does not continue past an uncaught throw or exit. */ +predicate continuingStep(CfgNode node, CfgNode next) { + next = node.getASuccessor() and + // The CFG currently propagates the normal completion of a throw's operand. + not exists(Stmt abort | + (abort instanceof ThrowStmt or abort instanceof ExitStmt or abort instanceof ReturnStmt) and + node.getAstNode().getParent*() = abort and + not next.getAstNode().getParent*() = abort and + not abort.getParent+() instanceof TryStmt and + not exists(TrapStmt trap | abort.getParent+() = trap.getParent()) + ) +} + +/** Holds if the entire compared value is derived from this digest, not a bypass value. */ +predicate isDigestValue(DataFlow::Node digest, DataFlow::Node actual) { + digestStep*(digest, actual) and + forall(DataFlow::LocalSourceNode origin | DataFlow::localFlow(origin, actual) | + digestStep*(digest, origin) + ) +} + +/** Facts established by a Boolean expression, independently of short-circuit CFG support. */ +predicate conditionImplies(Expr condition, boolean outcome, Expr tested, boolean required) { + condition = tested and required = [true, false] and outcome = required + or + conditionImplies(condition.(ParenExpr).getExpr(), outcome, tested, required) + or + exists(boolean inner | + ( + outcome = true and inner = false + or + outcome = false and inner = true + ) and + conditionImplies(condition.(NotExpr).getOperand(), inner, tested, required) + ) + or + outcome = true and + conditionImplies(condition.(LogicalAndExpr).getAnOperand(), true, tested, required) + or + outcome = false and + conditionImplies(condition.(LogicalOrExpr).getAnOperand(), false, tested, required) +} + +predicate hashGuard(HashCheck check, ExprCfgNode guard, BooleanSuccessor success) { + exists(ComparisonExpr comparison, DataFlow::Node actual, DataFlow::Node expected | + actual.asExpr().getExpr() = comparison.getAnOperand() and + expected.asExpr().getExpr() = comparison.getAnOperand() and + actual != expected and + isDigestValue(check.getDigest(), actual) and + isExpectedDigest(expected) and + conditionImplies(guard.getExpr(), success.getValue(), comparison, equalityMatchesOn(comparison)) and + precedes(check.getCfgNode(), guard) + ) +} + +/** Gets a property read from a particular value, including through local aliases. */ +bindingset[name] +DataFlow::Node getProperty(DataFlow::Node value, string name) { + exists(MemberExpr member, DataFlow::Node receiver | + member.memberNameMatches(name) and + receiver.asExpr().getExpr() = member.getQualifier() and + DataFlow::localFlow(value, receiver) and + result.asExpr().getExpr() = member + ) +} + +predicate hasFixedValue(DataFlow::Node value, string expected) { + exists(DataFlow::LocalSourceNode origin | + DataFlow::localFlow(origin, value) and expected = origin.asExpr().getValue().asString() + ) and + forall(DataFlow::LocalSourceNode origin | DataFlow::localFlow(origin, value) | + origin.asExpr().getValue().asString() = expected + ) +} + +boolean equalityMatchesOn(ComparisonExpr comparison) { + (comparison instanceof EqExpr or comparison instanceof CEqExpr) and + result = true + or + (comparison instanceof NeExpr or comparison instanceof CNeExpr) and + result = false } -module Conf implements DataFlow::ConfigSig { - predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source = any(DownloadCall c).getOutFileArg() } +/** A comparison of a particular value against an exact fixed string. */ +predicate stringGuard( + DataFlow::Node value, string expected, ExprCfgNode guard, BooleanSuccessor success +) { + exists(ComparisonExpr comparison, DataFlow::Node actual, DataFlow::Node other | + actual.asExpr().getExpr() = comparison.getAnOperand() and + other.asExpr().getExpr() = comparison.getAnOperand() and + actual != other and + isDigestValue(value, actual) and + hasFixedValue(other, expected) and + guard.getExpr() = comparison and + success.getValue() = equalityMatchesOn(comparison) + ) +} + +/** Holds if reaching `target` requires passing this guard's successful branch. */ +predicate requiresSuccess(ExprCfgNode guard, BooleanSuccessor success, CfgNode target) { + precedes(guard, target) and + exists(guard.getASuccessor(success)) and + not exists(CfgNode failure | + failure = guard.getASuccessor(success.getDual()) and continuingStep*(failure, target) + ) +} + +/** A signature must establish both validity and the expected publisher's certificate. */ +predicate authenticodeGuard(DataFlow::CallNode check, ExprCfgNode guard, BooleanSuccessor success) { + check.getAName() = "Get-AuthenticodeSignature" and + exists( + ExprCfgNode status, ExprCfgNode signer, BooleanSuccessor statusOk, BooleanSuccessor signerOk, + DataFlow::Node fingerprint, ComparisonExpr comparison + | + stringGuard(getProperty(check, "Status"), "Valid", status, statusOk) and + fingerprint = getProperty(getProperty(check, "SignerCertificate"), "Thumbprint") and + signer.getExpr() = comparison and + exists(DataFlow::Node actual, DataFlow::Node expected | + actual.asExpr().getExpr() = comparison.getAnOperand() and + expected.asExpr().getExpr() = comparison.getAnOperand() and + actual != expected and + isDigestValue(fingerprint, actual) and + isExpectedDigest(expected) + ) and + signerOk.getValue() = equalityMatchesOn(comparison) and + precedes(check.getCfgNode(), status) and + precedes(check.getCfgNode(), signer) and + ( + requiresSuccess(status, statusOk, signer) and guard = signer and success = signerOk + or + requiresSuccess(signer, signerOk, status) and guard = status and success = statusOk + or + conditionImplies(guard.getExpr(), success.getValue(), status.getExpr(), statusOk.getValue()) and + conditionImplies(guard.getExpr(), success.getValue(), signer.getExpr(), signerOk.getValue()) + ) + ) +} - predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink = any(IntegrityCheck c).getFile() } +/** Gets the value of a native command's long option, not a PowerShell parameter. */ +bindingset[name] +DataFlow::Node getNativeOption(DataFlow::CallNode call, string name) { + not call.getPositionalArgument(_).asExpr().getValue().asString().matches("--" + name + "=%") and + ( + result = call.getNamedArgument("-" + name) and + not call.getPositionalArgument(_).asExpr().getValue().asString() = "--" + name + or + not call.hasNamedArgument("-" + name) and + exists(int i | + i = + unique(int index | + call.getPositionalArgument(index).asExpr().getValue().asString() = "--" + name + | + index + ) and + result = call.getPositionalArgument(i + 1) + ) + ) +} + +bindingset[name] +predicate hasNativeOption(DataFlow::CallNode call, string name) { + call.hasNamedArgument("-" + name) + or + call.getPositionalArgument(_).asExpr().getValue().asString() = "--" + name + or + call.getPositionalArgument(_).asExpr().getValue().asString().matches("--" + name + "=%") +} + +/** Gets an operand, excluding long options and their following values. */ +bindingset[position] +DataFlow::Node getNativeOperand(DataFlow::CallNode call, int position) { + result = + rank[position + 1](DataFlow::Node operand, int i | + operand = call.getPositionalArgument(i) and + not operand.asExpr().getValue().asString().matches("--%") and + not call.getPositionalArgument(i - 1).asExpr().getValue().asString().matches("--%") + | + operand order by i + ) } -module Flow = TaintTracking::Global; +/** Native verification policies that establish the expected signer, not just any valid signature. */ +class NativeSignatureCheck extends DataFlow::CallNode { + NativeSignatureCheck() { this.getAName() = ["gpg", "gpg.exe", "cosign", "cosign.exe"] } + + DataFlow::Node getFile() { + this.getAName() = ["gpg", "gpg.exe"] and + exists(string fingerprint | + hasFixedValue(getNativeOption(this, "assert-signer"), fingerprint) and + fingerprint.regexpMatch("[0-9a-fA-F]+") and + fingerprint.length() = [40, 64] + ) and + exists(getNativeOption(this, "verify")) and + not exists(getNativeOperand(this, 1)) and + ( + result = getNativeOperand(this, 0) + or + not exists(getNativeOperand(this, 0)) and result = getNativeOption(this, "verify") + ) + or + this.getAName() = ["cosign", "cosign.exe"] and + getNativeOperand(this, 0).asExpr().getValue().asString() = "verify-blob" and + not exists(getNativeOperand(this, 2)) and + exists(string identity, string issuer | + hasFixedValue(getNativeOption(this, "certificate-identity"), identity) and + identity != "" and + hasFixedValue(getNativeOption(this, "certificate-oidc-issuer"), issuer) and + issuer.matches("https://%") + ) and + not hasNativeOption(this, + [ + "key", "trusted-root", "certificate-chain", "ca-roots", "ca-intermediates", + "insecure-ignore-sct", "insecure-ignore-tlog", "certificate-identity-regexp", + "certificate-oidc-issuer-regexp" + ]) and + result = getNativeOperand(this, 1) + } +} + +/** Only an unmodified exit code from this verifier can establish successful verification. */ +predicate nativeSignatureGuard( + NativeSignatureCheck check, ExprCfgNode guard, BooleanSuccessor success +) { + exists(ComparisonExpr comparison, Expr actual, Expr zero | + actual = comparison.getAnOperand() and + zero = comparison.getAnOperand() and + actual != zero and + actual.(AutomaticVariable).getLowerCaseName() = "lastexitcode" and + zero.getValue().asInt() = 0 and + conditionImplies(guard.getExpr(), success.getValue(), comparison, equalityMatchesOn(comparison)) and + precedes(check.getCfgNode(), guard) and + not exists(DataFlow::CallNode intervening | + intervening != check and + continuingStep+(check.getCfgNode(), intervening.getCfgNode()) and + continuingStep+(intervening.getCfgNode(), guard) + ) + ) +} + +/** An overwrite or removal stops tracking the previous downloaded file version. */ +predicate overwritesFile(DataFlow::Node file, CfgNode node) { + exists(DownloadCall download | + node = download.getCfgNode() and sameFile(file, download.getOutFileArg()) + ) + or + exists(FileWrite write | node = write.getCfgNode() and sameFile(file, write.getFile())) + or + exists(FileTransfer transfer | + node = transfer.getCfgNode() and + ( + transfer.removesInput() and sameFile(file, transfer.getInput()) + or + sameFile(file, transfer.getOutput()) + ) + ) + or + exists(DataFlow::CallNode remove | + node = remove.getCfgNode() and + ( + remove.getAName() = ["Remove-Item", "ri", "rm", "del"] and + sameFile(file, getFileArgument(remove)) + or + // Relative path identity cannot be assumed across a working-directory change. + remove.getAName() = ["Set-Location", "cd", "chdir", "sl", "Push-Location", "Pop-Location"] + ) + ) +} + +predicate producedFile(DataFlow::CallNode producer, DataFlow::Node file) { + file = producer.(DownloadCall).getOutFileArg() or + file = producer.(FileTransfer).getOutput() or + file = producer.(FileWrite).getFile() or + file = producer.(FileRead).getFile() or + archiveMember(producer.(ArchiveExtraction).getDirectory(), file) +} + +/** Reaches a node from a specific producer while the same file version is present. */ +predicate producedFileReaches(DataFlow::CallNode producer, DataFlow::Node file, CfgNode target) { + producedFile(producer, file) and continuingStep(producer.getCfgNode(), target) + or + exists(CfgNode node | + producedFileReaches(producer, file, node) and + not overwritesFile(file, node) and + continuingStep(node, target) + ) +} + +/** A check of an unchanged original also validates the copy made from it. */ +predicate checksProducedFile( + DataFlow::CallNode producer, DataFlow::Node file, DataFlow::Node checked, CfgNode check +) { + sameFile(file, checked) and producedFileReaches(producer, file, check) + or + exists(FileTransfer copy | + producer = copy and + not copy.removesInput() and + file = copy.getOutput() and + sameFile(copy.getInput(), checked) and + precedes(copy.getCfgNode(), check) and + not exists(CfgNode changed | + overwritesFile(copy.getInput(), changed) and + continuingStep+(copy.getCfgNode(), changed) and + continuingStep*(changed, check) + ) + ) +} + +/** Only this file version, checked after it was produced, can validate a path. */ +predicate fileVerificationEdge( + DataFlow::CallNode producer, DataFlow::Node file, CfgNode guard, CfgNode next +) { + exists(HashCheck check, ExprCfgNode condition, BooleanSuccessor success | + checksProducedFile(producer, file, check.getHashedFile(), check.getHashedFile().asExpr()) and + hashGuard(check, condition, success) and + guard = condition and + next = condition.getASuccessor(success) and + not next = condition.getASuccessor(success.getDual()) + ) + or + exists(DataFlow::CallNode check, ExprCfgNode condition, BooleanSuccessor success | + authenticodeGuard(check, condition, success) and + checksProducedFile(producer, file, getArgument(check, "filepath", 0), check.getCfgNode()) and + guard = condition and + next = condition.getASuccessor(success) and + not next = condition.getASuccessor(success.getDual()) + ) + or + exists(NativeSignatureCheck check, ExprCfgNode condition, BooleanSuccessor success | + checksProducedFile(producer, file, check.getFile(), check.getCfgNode()) and + nativeSignatureGuard(check, condition, success) and + guard = condition and + next = condition.getASuccessor(success) and + not next = condition.getASuccessor(success.getDual()) + ) +} + +/** An existential path to a particular use, excluding only successful verification edges. */ +predicate unverifiedFileReachable(DataFlow::CallNode producer, DataFlow::Node file, CfgNode target) { + producedFile(producer, file) and continuingStep(producer.getCfgNode(), target) + or + exists(CfgNode node | + unverifiedFileReachable(producer, file, node) and + not overwritesFile(file, node) and + continuingStep(node, target) and + not fileVerificationEdge(producer, file, node, target) + ) +} + +predicate unverifiedFileUse( + DataFlow::CallNode producer, DataFlow::Node file, DataFlow::CallNode use, DataFlow::Node input +) { + sameFile(file, input) and + unverifiedFileReachable(producer, file, use.getCfgNode()) +} + +/** Extra content steps represent bytes/text, never a path string becoming its file's bytes. */ +predicate contentStep(DataFlow::Node input, DataFlow::Node output) { + output = getProperty(input, ["Content", "Result"]) + or + exists(DataFlow::CallNode decode | + decode.getAName() = "GetString" and + decode + .getQualifier() + .asExpr() + .getExpr() + .(MemberExpr) + .getQualifier() + .(TypeNameExpr) + .getPossiblyQualifiedName() = ["System.Text.Encoding", "Text.Encoding"].toLowerCase() and + input = decode.getArgument(0) and + output = decode + ) + or + exists(DataFlow::CallNode create | + create.getAName() = "Create" and + isStaticCall(create, ["System.Management.Automation.ScriptBlock", "ScriptBlock"]) and + input = create.getArgument(0) and + output = create + ) +} + +module ContentConf implements DataFlow::ConfigSig { + predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { + source = any(DownloadCall d).getContent() or source instanceof FileRead + } + + predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { + sink = any(CodeExecution use).getContent() or + sink = any(FileWrite write).getContent() or + sink = any(HashCheck check).getArgument(0) + } + + predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(DataFlow::Node input, DataFlow::Node output) { + contentStep(input, output) + } +} + +module ContentFlow = TaintTracking::Global; + +predicate unverifiedContentReachable( + DataFlow::CallNode producer, DataFlow::Node content, CfgNode target +) { + ( + content = producer.(DownloadCall).getContent() + or + producer instanceof FileRead and content = producer + ) and + continuingStep(producer.getCfgNode(), target) + or + exists(CfgNode node | + unverifiedContentReachable(producer, content, node) and + continuingStep(node, target) and + not ( + producer instanceof FileRead and + fileVerificationEdge(producer, producer.(FileRead).getFile(), node, target) + ) and + not exists(HashCheck check, ExprCfgNode guard, BooleanSuccessor success | + check.getAName() = "ComputeHash" and + not exists(check.getArgument(1)) and + DataFlow::localFlow(content, check.getArgument(0)) and + hashGuard(check, guard, success) and + node = guard and + target = guard.getASuccessor(success) and + not target = guard.getASuccessor(success.getDual()) + ) + ) +} + +predicate unverifiedContentUse( + DataFlow::CallNode producer, DataFlow::Node content, DataFlow::CallNode use, DataFlow::Node input +) { + ContentFlow::flow(content, input) and + unverifiedContentReachable(producer, content, use.getCfgNode()) +} + +predicate pinnedHttpsUrl(DownloadCall download) { + exists( + ComparisonExpr comparison, ExprCfgNode guard, BooleanSuccessor success, DataFlow::Node actual, + DataFlow::Node expected, string url + | + actual.asExpr().getExpr() = comparison.getAnOperand() and + expected.asExpr().getExpr() = comparison.getAnOperand() and + actual != expected and + DataFlow::localFlow(actual, download.getUrl()) and + hasFixedValue(expected, url) and + url.toLowerCase().matches("https://%") and + conditionImplies(guard.getExpr(), success.getValue(), comparison, equalityMatchesOn(comparison)) and + requiresSuccess(guard, success, download.getCfgNode()) + ) +} + +/** The strict query needs evidence of a weaker trust boundary than a fixed HTTPS origin. */ +string getOriginReason(DownloadCall download) { + not pinnedHttpsUrl(download) and + ( + HttpOriginFlow::flow(_, download.getUrl()) and result = "over unencrypted HTTP" + or + not HttpOriginFlow::flow(_, download.getUrl()) and + RemoteOriginFlow::flow(_, download.getUrl()) and + result = "from a remotely controlled URL" + ) +} + +/** An unverified materialized file, preserving content through modeled filesystem operations. */ +predicate unverifiedFile(DownloadCall download, DataFlow::CallNode producer, DataFlow::Node file) { + exists(getOriginReason(download)) and + producer = download and + file = download.getOutFileArg() + or + exists(FileTransfer transfer, DataFlow::CallNode previous, DataFlow::Node source | + unverifiedFile(download, previous, source) and + unverifiedFileUse(previous, source, transfer, transfer.getInput()) and + producer = transfer and + file = transfer.getOutput() + ) + or + exists(ArchiveExtraction extract, DataFlow::CallNode previous, DataFlow::Node archive | + unverifiedFile(download, previous, archive) and + unverifiedFileUse(previous, archive, extract, extract.getFile()) and + producer = extract and + archiveMember(extract.getDirectory(), file) + ) + or + exists(FileWrite write, DataFlow::CallNode previous, DataFlow::Node content | + unverifiedContent(download, previous, content) and + unverifiedContentUse(previous, content, write, write.getContent()) and + producer = write and + file = write.getFile() + ) +} -/** Holds if the downloaded file `out` flows to an integrity check. */ -predicate isVerified(DataFlow::Node out) { - exists(Flow::PathNode source | - source.getNode() = out and - source.isSource() +predicate unverifiedContent( + DownloadCall download, DataFlow::CallNode producer, DataFlow::Node content +) { + exists(getOriginReason(download)) and + producer = download and + content = download.getContent() + or + exists(FileRead read, DataFlow::CallNode previous, DataFlow::Node file | + unverifiedFile(download, previous, file) and + unverifiedFileUse(previous, file, read, read.getFile()) and + producer = read and + content = read ) } -from DownloadCall call, DataFlow::Node out +from DownloadCall download, CodeExecution use, DataFlow::CallNode producer, DataFlow::Node artifact where - out = call.getOutFileArg() and - not isVerified(out) -select call, - "This downloads an artifact without verifying its integrity (e.g. a hash or signature check)." + unverifiedFile(download, producer, artifact) and + unverifiedFileUse(producer, artifact, use, use.getFile()) + or + unverifiedContent(download, producer, artifact) and + unverifiedContentUse(producer, artifact, use, use.getContent()) +select download, + "This download " + getOriginReason(download) + + " reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check.", use, + "code execution or loading" diff --git a/powershell/ql/src/queries/security/cwe-494/examples/powershell/DownloadWithoutIntegrityCheckBad.ps1 b/powershell/ql/src/queries/security/cwe-494/examples/powershell/DownloadWithoutIntegrityCheckBad.ps1 index d406ad64c79d..11661eb19dd3 100644 --- a/powershell/ql/src/queries/security/cwe-494/examples/powershell/DownloadWithoutIntegrityCheckBad.ps1 +++ b/powershell/ql/src/queries/security/cwe-494/examples/powershell/DownloadWithoutIntegrityCheckBad.ps1 @@ -1,8 +1,6 @@ -# BAD: An artifact is downloaded from GitHub and then executed without -# verifying that its contents match a known-good hash. If the release asset is -# replaced (for example, through a compromised account, a tampered mirror, or a -# man-in-the-middle attack), arbitrary code runs on the machine. -$uri = "https://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1.2.3/installer.exe" +# BAD: An HTTP download is executed without verification. An on-path attacker +# can replace the downloaded executable. +$uri = "http://downloads.example.com/installer.exe" $outFile = Join-Path $env:TEMP "installer.exe" Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $uri -OutFile $outFile diff --git a/powershell/ql/src/queries/security/cwe-494/examples/powershell/DownloadWithoutIntegrityCheckGood.ps1 b/powershell/ql/src/queries/security/cwe-494/examples/powershell/DownloadWithoutIntegrityCheckGood.ps1 index fa7646ec2815..91d539378a00 100644 --- a/powershell/ql/src/queries/security/cwe-494/examples/powershell/DownloadWithoutIntegrityCheckGood.ps1 +++ b/powershell/ql/src/queries/security/cwe-494/examples/powershell/DownloadWithoutIntegrityCheckGood.ps1 @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -# GOOD: The artifact is downloaded from GitHub and its SHA-256 hash is compared +# GOOD: The artifact's SHA-256 hash is compared # against the expected value (published by the author through a trusted channel, # such as the signed release notes) before it is used. The artifact is only # executed once its integrity has been confirmed. -$uri = "https://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1.2.3/installer.exe" +$uri = "http://downloads.example.com/installer.exe" $outFile = Join-Path $env:TEMP "installer.exe" $expectedHash = "8c954cd9b6c8f8180a05f1de66ee555f0c44b4c6738120785d827521bb8d54df" diff --git a/powershell/ql/test/query-tests/security/cwe-494/DownloadWithoutIntegrityCheck.expected b/powershell/ql/test/query-tests/security/cwe-494/DownloadWithoutIntegrityCheck.expected index e44db9cf3629..a82527783b45 100644 --- a/powershell/ql/test/query-tests/security/cwe-494/DownloadWithoutIntegrityCheck.expected +++ b/powershell/ql/test/query-tests/security/cwe-494/DownloadWithoutIntegrityCheck.expected @@ -1,7 +1,61 @@ -| test.ps1:22:3:22:47 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This downloads an artifact without verifying its integrity (e.g. a hash or signature check). | -| test.ps1:40:3:40:103 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This downloads an artifact without verifying its integrity (e.g. a hash or signature check). | -| test.ps1:45:3:45:89 | Call to iwr | This downloads an artifact without verifying its integrity (e.g. a hash or signature check). | -| test.ps1:66:3:66:95 | Call to downloadfile | This downloads an artifact without verifying its integrity (e.g. a hash or signature check). | -| test.ps1:71:3:71:118 | Call to downloadfile | This downloads an artifact without verifying its integrity (e.g. a hash or signature check). | -| test.ps1:76:3:76:116 | Call to start-bitstransfer | This downloads an artifact without verifying its integrity (e.g. a hash or signature check). | -| test.ps1:81:3:81:91 | Call to curl | This downloads an artifact without verifying its integrity (e.g. a hash or signature check). | +| test.ps1:22:3:22:47 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:23:3:23:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:42:3:42:102 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:43:3:43:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:48:3:48:88 | Call to iwr | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:49:3:49:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:54:8:54:100 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:55:3:55:30 | Call to invoke-expression | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:60:3:60:74 | Call to irm | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:60:78:60:94 | Call to invoke-expression | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:70:3:70:94 | Call to downloadfile | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:71:3:71:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:76:3:76:117 | Call to downloadfile | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:77:3:77:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:82:3:82:115 | Call to start-bitstransfer | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:83:3:83:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:88:3:88:61 | Call to curl.exe | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:89:3:89:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:98:3:98:61 | Call to azcopy | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:99:3:99:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:140:3:140:47 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:143:3:143:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:149:3:149:47 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:151:3:151:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:176:3:176:102 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:178:3:178:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:182:3:182:102 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:187:3:187:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:191:3:191:102 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:196:3:196:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:200:3:200:102 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:201:3:201:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:207:3:207:102 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:210:3:210:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:214:3:214:102 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:217:3:217:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:221:3:221:102 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:224:3:224:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:228:3:228:102 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:235:3:235:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:241:3:241:102 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:242:3:242:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:246:3:246:102 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:248:3:248:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:252:3:252:102 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:255:3:255:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:276:3:276:102 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:277:3:277:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:283:3:283:102 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:286:3:286:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:290:3:290:102 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:296:3:296:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:301:3:301:102 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:305:3:305:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:325:3:325:102 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:330:3:330:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:335:3:335:102 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:338:3:338:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:360:3:360:42 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download from a remotely controlled URL reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:361:3:361:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:383:3:383:85 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:384:3:384:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:402:3:402:105 | Call to invoke-restmethod | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:403:3:403:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:407:3:407:103 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:408:3:408:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:413:3:413:73 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:414:3:414:31 | Call to start-process | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:419:3:419:73 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:420:3:420:31 | Call to start-process | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:443:3:443:76 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:444:3:444:65 | Call to start-process | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:453:3:453:80 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:454:3:454:68 | Call to start-process | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:458:3:458:76 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:459:3:459:29 | Call to msiexec.exe | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:468:3:468:80 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:469:31:469:47 | Call to invoke-expression | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:473:11:473:70 | Call to invoke-restmethod | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:475:3:475:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:479:3:479:79 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:480:3:480:50 | Call to loadfrom | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:485:12:485:74 | Call to downloaddata | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:486:3:486:44 | Call to load | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:490:3:490:76 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:492:3:492:10 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:502:3:502:76 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:504:3:504:21 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:508:3:508:76 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:513:3:513:9 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:525:3:525:76 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:530:3:530:9 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:539:3:539:72 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:542:3:542:8 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:562:3:562:72 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:566:3:566:36 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:587:3:587:85 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:588:3:588:17 | Call to install.ps1 | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:614:3:614:76 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:615:3:615:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:647:3:647:76 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:651:3:651:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:669:3:669:76 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:672:3:672:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:676:3:676:76 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:679:3:679:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:683:3:683:76 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:687:3:687:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:691:3:691:76 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:695:3:695:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:699:3:699:76 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:702:3:702:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:706:3:706:76 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:709:3:709:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:714:13:714:78 | Call to getstringasync | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:715:3:715:36 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:741:3:741:76 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:746:3:746:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:750:3:750:76 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:753:3:753:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | +| test.ps1:766:3:766:76 | Call to invoke-webrequest | This download over unencrypted HTTP reaches $@ without an effective integrity or expected-publisher check. | test.ps1:771:3:771:12 | Call to | code execution or loading | diff --git a/powershell/ql/test/query-tests/security/cwe-494/test.ps1 b/powershell/ql/test/query-tests/security/cwe-494/test.ps1 index df443d37aeb0..f0401b939967 100644 --- a/powershell/ql/test/query-tests/security/cwe-494/test.ps1 +++ b/powershell/ql/test/query-tests/security/cwe-494/test.ps1 @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -# CWE-494 - Download of a GitHub release artifact without an integrity check. +# CWE-494 - Execution of an insecure or attacker-controlled download. # -# Each function below is one download idiom. It documents, as inline -# expectations, which idioms the query catches and which it still misses: +# A finding requires both a modeled untrusted origin and code execution/loading. +# Download-only, extraction-only, and fixed HTTPS origins are outside this scope. # # # $ Alert -> the query reports here (expected true positive) # # $ MISSING: Alert -> the query SHOULD report here but does not yet @@ -17,84 +17,92 @@ # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- function Iwr_NamedUri_OutFile($outFile) { - # BAD - baseline; download from github with no hash check. - $uri = "https://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1.2.3/installer.exe" + # BAD - an on-path attacker can replace the executable. + $uri = "http://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1.2.3/installer.exe" Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $uri -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + & $outFile } function Iwr_NamedUri_OutFile_Hashed($outFile) { - # GOOD - Get-FileHash barrier on the downloaded file (correctly NOT flagged). - $uri = "https://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1.2.3/installer.exe" + # GOOD - mismatch terminates before the downloaded artifact can be used. + $uri = "http://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1.2.3/installer.exe" $expected = "8c954cd9b6c8f8180a05f1de66ee555f0c44b4c6738120785d827521bb8d54df" Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $uri -OutFile $outFile $actual = (Get-FileHash -Path $outFile -Algorithm SHA256).Hash if ($actual -ne $expected) { Remove-Item $outFile -Force; throw "hash mismatch" } + & $outFile } # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# MISSING: argument-shape variants of Invoke-WebRequest / Invoke-RestMethod. +# Argument-shape variants of Invoke-WebRequest / Invoke-RestMethod. # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- function Iwr_PositionalUri($outFile) { # BAD - URL passed positionally, not as -Uri. - Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + Invoke-WebRequest "http://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + & $outFile } function Iwr_Alias_Positional($outFile) { # BAD - iwr alias + positional URL. - iwr "https://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.zip" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + iwr "http://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + & $outFile } function Iwr_NoOutFile_PipedToIex() { # BAD - no -OutFile; content executed inline. - $r = Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/bootstrap.ps1" # $ MISSING: Alert + $r = Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "http://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/bootstrap.ps1" # $ Alert Invoke-Expression $r.Content } function Irm_NoOutFile() { # BAD - Invoke-RestMethod returns content, no -OutFile. - irm "https://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/install.ps1" | Invoke-Expression # $ MISSING: Alert + irm "http://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/install.ps1" | Invoke-Expression # $ Alert } # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# MISSING: download sinks that are not in the cmdlet name list at all. +# Other modeled download APIs. # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- function WebClient_DownloadFile($outFile) { # BAD - System.Net.WebClient.DownloadFile. $wc = New-Object System.Net.WebClient - $wc.DownloadFile("https://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe", $outFile) # $ Alert + $wc.DownloadFile("http://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe", $outFile) # $ Alert + & $outFile } function WebClient_Inline($outFile) { # BAD - inline (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile(...). - (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile("https://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe", $outFile) # $ Alert + (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile("http://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe", $outFile) # $ Alert + & $outFile } function Bits_Transfer($outFile) { # BAD - Start-BitsTransfer. - Start-BitsTransfer -Source "https://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe" -Destination $outFile # $ Alert + Start-BitsTransfer -Source "http://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe" -Destination $outFile # $ Alert + & $outFile } function Curl_Native($outFile) { - # BAD - native curl with -o. - curl -sL "https://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.tar.gz" -o $outFile # $ Alert + # BAD - native curl with an explicit destination. + curl.exe "http://downloads.example.com/app.exe" -o $outFile # $ Alert + & $outFile } function Wget_Native() { - # BAD - native wget piped to tar (no output file at all). - wget "https://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.tar.gz" # $ MISSING: Alert + # No execution: merely retrieving an archive is not enough. + wget "http://downloads.example.com/app.tar.gz" } function AzCopy($outFile) { - # BAD - azcopy / aria2c. - azcopy copy "https://github.com/Azure/azure-storage-azcopy/releases/download/v10.31.0/azcopy.zip" $outFile # $ MISSING: Alert + azcopy copy "http://downloads.example.com/app.exe" $outFile # $ Alert + & $outFile } function Wrapper_Function($outFile) { - # BAD - custom download wrapper; the real Invoke-WebRequest lives in a - # dot-sourced helper. - Download-File "https://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe" $outFile # $ MISSING: Alert + # An undefined helper is not evidence that a download takes place. + Download-File "http://downloads.example.com/app.exe" $outFile + & $outFile } # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -102,47 +110,49 @@ function Wrapper_Function($outFile) { # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- function Verified_With_CertUtil($outFile) { - # GOOD - certutil hash verification (now recognised as an integrity barrier). - $uri = "https://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe" + # GOOD - certutil computes a hash and mismatch terminates the script. + $uri = "http://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe" Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $uri -OutFile $outFile $h = certutil -hashfile $outFile SHA256 - if ($h -notmatch "ABC123") { throw "hash mismatch" } + if ($h -ne "8c954cd9b6c8f8180a05f1de66ee555f0c44b4c6738120785d827521bb8d54df") { throw "hash mismatch" } + & $outFile } # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# TRUE NEGATIVES: these must NOT be flagged. Either the download is verified, -# or it is not a trusted-host artifact download at all. No inline expectation -# means "no alert expected here". +# Verification and excluded origin/use patterns. # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- function Verified_With_ComputeHash($outFile) { # GOOD - hash computed via [SHA256]::Create().ComputeHash over the bytes read # from the downloaded file, then compared. - $uri = "https://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe" + $uri = "http://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe" Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $uri -OutFile $outFile $sha = [System.Security.Cryptography.SHA256]::Create() $bytes = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($outFile) $hash = [System.BitConverter]::ToString($sha.ComputeHash($bytes)).Replace("-", "") - if ($hash -ne "ABC123") { throw "hash mismatch" } + if ($hash -ne "8c954cd9b6c8f8180a05f1de66ee555f0c44b4c6738120785d827521bb8d54df") { throw "hash mismatch" } + & $outFile } function Verified_With_Signature($outFile) { - # GOOD - Authenticode signature check on the downloaded file. - $uri = "https://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe" - Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $uri -OutFile $outFile + # Status alone does not establish the intended publisher. + $uri = "http://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe" + Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $uri -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert $sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $outFile if ($sig.Status -ne "Valid") { throw "bad signature" } + & $outFile } function Verified_With_Cosign($outFile) { - # GOOD - external signature verification via cosign. - $uri = "https://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.tar.gz" - Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $uri -OutFile $outFile + # Merely invoking a verifier does not enforce its result. + $uri = "http://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe" + Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $uri -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert cosign verify-blob --signature "$outFile.sig" $outFile + & $outFile } function NonArtifact_Host($outFile) { - # GOOD - download from a host that is not a recognised artifact host. + # A fixed HTTPS origin with no code execution is outside the strict scope. Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://example.com/data/report.json" -OutFile $outFile } @@ -154,6 +164,609 @@ function GitHub_Api_DataOnly() { } function Local_Copy($outFile) { - # GOOD - copying a local file; no network download, no trusted-host URL. + # GOOD - copying a local file; no network download. Copy-Item -Path "C:\artifacts\app.exe" -Destination $outFile } + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Hashing is only verification when a complete expected digest is enforced. +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +function Hash_Ignored($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + Get-FileHash -Path $outFile -Algorithm SHA256 + & $outFile +} + +function Hash_Mismatch_OnlyLogged($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + $hash = (Get-FileHash -Path $outFile).Hash + if ($hash -ne "8c954cd9b6c8f8180a05f1de66ee555f0c44b4c6738120785d827521bb8d54df") { + Write-Error "hash mismatch" + } + & $outFile +} + +function Hash_Conditional($outFile, $verify) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + if ($verify) { + $hash = (Get-FileHash -Path $outFile).Hash + if ($hash -ne "8c954cd9b6c8f8180a05f1de66ee555f0c44b4c6738120785d827521bb8d54df") { throw "hash mismatch" } + } + & $outFile +} + +function Hash_AfterUse($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + & $outFile + $hash = (Get-FileHash -Path $outFile).Hash + if ($hash -ne "8c954cd9b6c8f8180a05f1de66ee555f0c44b4c6738120785d827521bb8d54df") { throw "hash mismatch" } +} + +function Hash_WrongFile($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + $hash = (Get-FileHash -Path "$outFile.sig").Hash + if ($hash -ne "8c954cd9b6c8f8180a05f1de66ee555f0c44b4c6738120785d827521bb8d54df") { throw "hash mismatch" } + & $outFile +} + +function Hash_WrongProperty($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + $algorithm = (Get-FileHash -Path $outFile).Algorithm + if ($algorithm -ne "SHA256") { throw "unexpected algorithm" } + & $outFile +} + +function Hash_SelfComparison($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + $hash = (Get-FileHash -Path $outFile).Hash + if ($hash -ne $hash) { throw "hash mismatch" } + & $outFile +} + +function Hash_Mismatch_Caught($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + try { + $hash = (Get-FileHash -Path $outFile).Hash + if ($hash -ne "8c954cd9b6c8f8180a05f1de66ee555f0c44b4c6738120785d827521bb8d54df") { throw "hash mismatch" } + } catch { + Write-Warning "Continuing despite hash failure" + } + & $outFile +} + +function Hash_BeforeDownload($outFile) { + $hash = (Get-FileHash -Path $outFile).Hash + if ($hash -ne "8c954cd9b6c8f8180a05f1de66ee555f0c44b4c6738120785d827521bb8d54df") { throw "hash mismatch" } + Invoke-WebRequest "http://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + & $outFile +} + +function CertUtil_NotHashing($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + certutil -encode $outFile "$outFile.b64" + & $outFile +} + +function ComputeHash_Ignored($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + $sha = [System.Security.Cryptography.SHA256]::Create() + $sha.ComputeHash([System.IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($outFile)) + & $outFile +} + +function Hash_Valid_Alias_ReversedOperands($outFile) { + iwr "http://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile + $hash = (gfh -LiteralPath $outFile).Hash + if ("8c954cd9b6c8f8180a05f1de66ee555f0c44b4c6738120785d827521bb8d54df" -cne $hash) { throw "hash mismatch" } + & $outFile +} + +function Hash_Valid_EqualityElse($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile + $hash = (Get-FileHash $outFile).Hash + if ($hash -eq "8c954cd9b6c8f8180a05f1de66ee555f0c44b4c6738120785d827521bb8d54df") { + & $outFile + } else { + throw "hash mismatch" + } +} + +function Hash_AfterCallOperatorUse($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + & $outFile + $hash = (Get-FileHash -Path $outFile).Hash + if ($hash -ne "8c954cd9b6c8f8180a05f1de66ee555f0c44b4c6738120785d827521bb8d54df") { throw "hash mismatch" } +} + +function Hash_PartialDigest($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + $hash = (Get-FileHash -Path $outFile).Hash.Substring(0, 6) + if ($hash -ne "8c954c") { throw "hash mismatch" } + & $outFile +} + +function Hash_UntrustedExpected($outFile, $expected, $usePinnedHash) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + if ($usePinnedHash) { + $expected = "8c954cd9b6c8f8180a05f1de66ee555f0c44b4c6738120785d827521bb8d54df" + } + $hash = (Get-FileHash -Path $outFile).Hash + if ($hash -ne $expected) { throw "hash mismatch" } + & $outFile +} + +function ComputeHash_StaleBytes($outFile) { + $bytes = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($outFile) + Invoke-WebRequest "http://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + $sha = [System.Security.Cryptography.SHA256]::Create() + $hash = [System.Convert]::ToHexString($sha.ComputeHash($bytes)) + if ($hash -ne "8c954cd9b6c8f8180a05f1de66ee555f0c44b4c6738120785d827521bb8d54df") { throw "hash mismatch" } + & $outFile +} + +function Hash_Valid_BeforeUse($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile + Write-Verbose "Downloaded $outFile" + $hash = (Get-FileHash -Path $outFile).Hash.ToLowerInvariant() + if ($hash -ne "8c954cd9b6c8f8180a05f1de66ee555f0c44b4c6738120785d827521bb8d54df") { exit 1 } + & $outFile +} + +function ComputeHash_Valid_HexString($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile + $sha = [System.Security.Cryptography.SHA256]::Create() + $hash = [System.Convert]::ToHexString($sha.ComputeHash([System.IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($outFile))) + if ($hash -ne "8c954cd9b6c8f8180a05f1de66ee555f0c44b4c6738120785d827521bb8d54df") { throw "hash mismatch" } + & $outFile +} + +function ComputeHash_PartialBuffer($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + $bytes = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($outFile) + $sha = [System.Security.Cryptography.SHA256]::Create() + $hash = [System.Convert]::ToHexString($sha.ComputeHash($bytes, 0, 100)) + if ($hash -ne "8c954cd9b6c8f8180a05f1de66ee555f0c44b4c6738120785d827521bb8d54df") { throw "hash mismatch" } + & $outFile +} + +function Hash_Mismatch_Trapped($outFile) { + trap { continue } + Invoke-WebRequest "http://github.com/example/project/releases/download/v1/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + $hash = (Get-FileHash -Path $outFile).Hash + if ($hash -ne "8c954cd9b6c8f8180a05f1de66ee555f0c44b4c6738120785d827521bb8d54df") { throw "hash mismatch" } + & $outFile +} + +# Strict origin and execution requirements. + +function FixedHttps_Executed($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "https://downloads.example.com/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile + & $outFile +} + +function UnknownUrl_Executed($url, $outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest $url -OutFile $outFile + & $outFile +} + +function EnvironmentUrl_Executed($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest $env:INSTALLER_URL -OutFile $outFile + & $outFile +} + +function RequestUrl_Executed([System.Net.HttpListenerRequest]$request, $outFile) { + $url = $request.QueryString["download"] + Invoke-WebRequest $url -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + & $outFile +} + +function RequestUrl_PinnedHttps([System.Net.HttpListenerRequest]$request, $outFile) { + $url = $request.QueryString["download"] + if ($url -ne "https://downloads.example.com/app.exe") { throw "unexpected URL" } + Invoke-WebRequest $url -OutFile $outFile + & $outFile +} + +function RequestUrl_OnlyInQuery([System.Net.HttpListenerRequest]$request, $outFile) { + $tracking = $request.QueryString["tracking"] + Invoke-WebRequest "https://downloads.example.com/app.exe?tracking=$tracking" -OutFile $outFile + & $outFile +} + +function Http_InQueryOnly($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "https://downloads.example.com/app.exe?mirror=http://elsewhere.example.com" -OutFile $outFile + & $outFile +} + +function Http_Interpolated($version, $outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "HTTP://downloads.example.com/$version/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + & $outFile +} + +function Http_DownloadOnly($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile +} + +function Http_ConfigOnly($outFile) { + Invoke-RestMethod "http://app.scm.azurewebsites.net/api/vfs/site/wwwroot/Config.js" -OutFile $outFile + Get-Content $outFile +} + +function Https_KuduExecutable($outFile) { + Invoke-RestMethod "https://app.scm.azurewebsites.net/api/vfs/site/wwwroot/install.ps1" -OutFile $outFile + & $outFile +} + +function Http_KuduExecutable($outFile) { + Invoke-RestMethod "http://app.scm.azurewebsites.net/api/vfs/site/wwwroot/install.ps1" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + & $outFile +} + +function Http_ApiExecutable($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://api.github.com/repos/example/project/releases/assets/123" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + & $outFile +} + +function StartProcess_Executable() { + $file = "downloaded.exe" + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.exe" -OutFile $file # $ Alert + Start-Process -FilePath $file +} + +function StartProcess_ExecutableChildPath() { + $file = Join-Path $env:TEMP "downloaded.exe" + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.exe" -OutFile $file # $ Alert + Start-Process -FilePath $file +} + +function StartProcess_VerifiedChildPath() { + $file = Join-Path $env:TEMP "downloaded.exe" + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.exe" -OutFile $file + $hash = (Get-FileHash $file).Hash + if ($hash -ne "8c954cd9b6c8f8180a05f1de66ee555f0c44b4c6738120785d827521bb8d54df") { throw "hash mismatch" } + Start-Process -FilePath $file +} + +function StartProcess_DataAssociation() { + $file = "report.json" + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/report.json" -OutFile $file + Start-Process -FilePath $file +} + +function StartProcess_UnrelatedArgument($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/report.json" -OutFile $outFile + Start-Process "notepad.exe" -ArgumentList $outFile +} + +function StartProcess_InstallerPackage($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.msi" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + Start-Process "msiexec.exe" -ArgumentList "/i", $outFile, "/qn" +} + +function StartProcess_InstallerLog($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.msi" -OutFile $outFile + Start-Process "msiexec.exe" -ArgumentList "/i", "local.msi", "/log", $outFile +} + +function StartProcess_PowerShellFile($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/install.ps1" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + Start-Process "pwsh" -ArgumentList "-NoProfile", "-File", $outFile +} + +function Installer_ActualPackage($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.msi" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + msiexec.exe /i $outFile /qn +} + +function Installer_LogFileOnly($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.msi" -OutFile $outFile + msiexec.exe /i "local.msi" /log $outFile +} + +function ReadThenExecute($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/install.ps1" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + Get-Content -Raw $outFile | Invoke-Expression +} + +function BodyWrittenThenExecuted($outFile) { + $body = Invoke-RestMethod "http://downloads.example.com/install.ps1" # $ Alert + $body | Set-Content -Path $outFile + . $outFile +} + +function Assembly_Loaded($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/plugin.dll" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + [System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadFrom($outFile) +} + +function WebClient_BytesLoaded() { + $client = [System.Net.WebClient]::new() + $bytes = $client.DownloadData("http://downloads.example.com/plugin.dll") # $ Alert + [System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load($bytes) +} + +function MovedThenExecuted($outFile, $moved) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + Move-Item $outFile -Destination $moved + & $moved +} + +function MovedOriginal_NotExecuted($outFile, $moved) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile + Move-Item $outFile -Destination $moved + & $outFile +} + +function RenamedThenExecuted($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + $renamed = Rename-Item $outFile -NewName "renamed.exe" -PassThru + & $renamed.FullName +} + +function CopyNotVerifiedByChangedOriginal($outFile, $copy) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + Copy-Item $outFile -Destination $copy + Set-Content $outFile "trusted replacement" + $hash = (Get-FileHash $outFile).Hash + if ($hash -ne "8c954cd9b6c8f8180a05f1de66ee555f0c44b4c6738120785d827521bb8d54df") { throw "hash mismatch" } + & $copy +} + +function CopyVerifiedByUnchangedOriginal($outFile, $copy) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile + Copy-Item $outFile -Destination $copy + $hash = (Get-FileHash $outFile).Hash + if ($hash -ne "8c954cd9b6c8f8180a05f1de66ee555f0c44b4c6738120785d827521bb8d54df") { throw "hash mismatch" } + & $copy +} + +function CopyNotVerifiedByOptionallyChangedOriginal($outFile, $copy, $replace) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + Copy-Item $outFile -Destination $copy + if ($replace) { Set-Content $outFile "trusted replacement" } + $hash = (Get-FileHash $outFile).Hash + if ($hash -ne "8c954cd9b6c8f8180a05f1de66ee555f0c44b4c6738120785d827521bb8d54df") { throw "hash mismatch" } + & $copy +} + +function Archive_ExtractionOnly($zip, $directory) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.zip" -OutFile $zip + Expand-Archive $zip -DestinationPath $directory +} + +function Archive_ExtractedCodeExecuted($zip, $directory) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.zip" -OutFile $zip # $ Alert + Expand-Archive $zip -DestinationPath $directory + $exe = Join-Path $directory "bin\app.exe" + & $exe +} + +function Archive_VerifiedBeforeExecution($zip, $directory) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.zip" -OutFile $zip + $hash = (Get-FileHash $zip).Hash + if ($hash -ne "8c954cd9b6c8f8180a05f1de66ee555f0c44b4c6738120785d827521bb8d54df") { throw "hash mismatch" } + Expand-Archive $zip -DestinationPath $directory + & (Join-Path $directory "app.exe") +} + +function Archive_VerifiedMemberWithReconstructedPath($zip, $directory) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.zip" -OutFile $zip + Expand-Archive $zip -DestinationPath $directory + $hash = (Get-FileHash (Join-Path $directory "app.exe")).Hash + if ($hash -ne "8c954cd9b6c8f8180a05f1de66ee555f0c44b4c6738120785d827521bb8d54df") { throw "hash mismatch" } + & (Join-Path $directory "app.exe") +} + +function Archive_DifferentMemberVerified($zip, $directory) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.zip" -OutFile $zip # $ Alert + Expand-Archive $zip -DestinationPath $directory + $hash = (Get-FileHash (Join-Path $directory "other.exe")).Hash + if ($hash -ne "8c954cd9b6c8f8180a05f1de66ee555f0c44b4c6738120785d827521bb8d54df") { throw "hash mismatch" } + & (Join-Path $directory "app.exe") +} + +function FilePathSuffixIsNotDownloadedFile($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile + & "$outFile.other.exe" +} + +function OverwrittenBeforeExecution($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/install.ps1" -OutFile $outFile + Set-Content $outFile "Write-Output 'local code'" + & $outFile +} + +function RedownloadedBeforeExecution($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile + Invoke-WebRequest "https://downloads.example.com/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile + & $outFile +} + +function SeparateLiteralFileReferences() { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/install.ps1" -OutFile "install.ps1" # $ Alert + & "install.ps1" +} + +function MutuallyExclusiveDownloadAndUse($condition, $outFile) { + if ($condition) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile + } else { + & $outFile + } +} + +# Verification is a path property, not the presence of a check somewhere in a function. + +function BothBranchesVerified($outFile, $condition) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile + if ($condition) { + $hash = (Get-FileHash $outFile).Hash + if ($hash -ne "8c954cd9b6c8f8180a05f1de66ee555f0c44b4c6738120785d827521bb8d54df") { throw "hash mismatch" } + } else { + $hash = (Get-FileHash $outFile).Hash + if ($hash -ne "8c954cd9b6c8f8180a05f1de66ee555f0c44b4c6738120785d827521bb8d54df") { throw "hash mismatch" } + } + & $outFile +} + +function OnlyOneUseVerified($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + & $outFile + $hash = (Get-FileHash $outFile).Hash + if ($hash -ne "8c954cd9b6c8f8180a05f1de66ee555f0c44b4c6738120785d827521bb8d54df") { throw "hash mismatch" } + & $outFile +} + +function ReadBeforeValidatingSameFile($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/install.ps1" -OutFile $outFile + $script = Get-Content -Raw $outFile + $hash = (Get-FileHash $outFile).Hash + if ($hash -ne "8c954cd9b6c8f8180a05f1de66ee555f0c44b4c6738120785d827521bb8d54df") { throw "hash mismatch" } + Invoke-Expression $script +} + +function Signature_ExpectedPublisher($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile + $sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $outFile + if ($sig.Status -ne "Valid") { throw "bad signature" } + if ($sig.SignerCertificate.Thumbprint -ne "0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF01234567") { throw "wrong publisher" } + & $outFile +} + +function Signature_ExpectedPublisherCombinedGuard($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile + $sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $outFile + if ($sig.Status -ne "Valid" -or $sig.SignerCertificate.Thumbprint -ne "0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF01234567") { + throw "invalid or unexpected signer" + } + & $outFile +} + +function Signature_IgnoredFailure($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + $sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $outFile + if ($sig.Status -ne "Valid") { Write-Warning "bad signature" } + if ($sig.SignerCertificate.Thumbprint -ne "0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF01234567") { Write-Warning "wrong publisher" } + & $outFile +} + +function Signature_GpgExpectedSigner($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile + gpg --assert-signer "0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF01234567" --verify "$outFile.sig" $outFile + if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "bad signature" } + & $outFile +} + +function Signature_CosignExpectedIdentity($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile + cosign verify-blob $outFile --bundle "$outFile.sigstore.json" --certificate-identity "release@example.com" --certificate-oidc-issuer "https://accounts.google.com" + if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "bad signature" } + & $outFile +} + +function Signature_GpgUnexpectedSigner($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + gpg --verify "$outFile.sig" $outFile + if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "bad signature" } + & $outFile +} + +function Signature_CosignIgnoredFailure($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + cosign verify-blob $outFile --bundle "$outFile.sigstore.json" --certificate-identity "release@example.com" --certificate-oidc-issuer "https://accounts.google.com" + if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { Write-Warning "bad signature" } + & $outFile +} + +function Signature_GpgOtherExitCode($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + gpg --assert-signer "0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF01234567" --verify "$outFile.sig" $outFile + cmd.exe /c "exit 0" + if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "bad signature" } + & $outFile +} + +function Signature_GpgOverwrittenExitCode($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + gpg --assert-signer "0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF01234567" --verify "$outFile.sig" $outFile + $LASTEXITCODE = 0 + if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "bad signature" } + & $outFile +} + +function Signature_GpgWrongFile($outFile, $other) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + gpg --assert-signer "0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF01234567" --verify "$other.sig" $other + if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "bad signature" } + & $outFile +} + +function Signature_GpgAdditionalSigner($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + gpg --assert-signer "0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF01234567" "--assert-signer=89ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF" --verify "$outFile.sig" $outFile + if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "bad signature" } + & $outFile +} + +function HttpClient_ResponseExecuted() { + $client = [System.Net.Http.HttpClient]::new() + $script = $client.GetStringAsync("http://downloads.example.com/install.ps1").Result # $ Alert + & ([ScriptBlock]::Create($script)) +} + +function ResponseIsNotCallerControl($outFile) { + $client = [System.Net.WebClient]::new() + $url = $client.DownloadString("https://downloads.example.com/latest-url") + Invoke-WebRequest $url -OutFile $outFile + & $outFile +} + +function ReturnedTextIsNotAScriptBlock() { + $text = Invoke-RestMethod "http://downloads.example.com/script.txt" + # A string passed to & is a command name, not PowerShell source text. + & $text +} + +function Hash_CombinedFailClosed($outFile, $otherFailure) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile + $hash = (Get-FileHash $outFile).Hash + if ($hash -ne "8c954cd9b6c8f8180a05f1de66ee555f0c44b4c6738120785d827521bb8d54df" -or $otherFailure) { + throw "verification failed" + } + & $outFile +} + +function Hash_CombinedBypass($outFile, $verify) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + $hash = (Get-FileHash $outFile).Hash + if ($hash -ne "8c954cd9b6c8f8180a05f1de66ee555f0c44b4c6738120785d827521bb8d54df" -and $verify) { + throw "verification failed" + } + & $outFile +} + +function Hash_ComparisonWithoutEnforcement($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + $hash = (Get-FileHash $outFile).Hash + if ($hash -eq "8c954cd9b6c8f8180a05f1de66ee555f0c44b4c6738120785d827521bb8d54df") { } + & $outFile +} + +function Hash_NegatedEquality($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile + $hash = (Get-FileHash $outFile).Hash + if (-not ($hash -eq "8c954cd9b6c8f8180a05f1de66ee555f0c44b4c6738120785d827521bb8d54df")) { + throw "verification failed" + } + & $outFile +} + +function Signature_CombinedBypass($outFile) { + Invoke-WebRequest "http://downloads.example.com/app.exe" -OutFile $outFile # $ Alert + $sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $outFile + if ($sig.Status -ne "Valid" -and $sig.SignerCertificate.Thumbprint -ne "0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF01234567") { + throw "invalid or unexpected signer" + } + & $outFile +}